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Game Theory Audit & Deterrence Simulator.

Model rational frontline coping mechanisms and evasion strategies against audit inspection intensity. Solve bimatrix payoffs for pure and mixed Nash equilibria.

100% Client-Side Computation Mathematical equilibrium solving and bimatrix calculations run entirely inside your browser sandbox. Zero data egress.

Game Theory Audit & Deterrence Simulator

Solve for Pure and Mixed Nash Equilibria in corporate control evasion vs assurance telemetry.

Select Institutional Dilemma

Payoff & Friction Calibration

Payoff from undetected leakage / fraud50

Expected financial or operational gain from exploiting the gap

10100

Penalty / clawback if caught100

Severity of disciplinary, legal, or reputational sanction

20200

Cost of automated CCM infrastructure15

Resource cost to maintain 100% continuous data pipelines

540

Competing Agents

Player 1 (Row):Operations / Rogue Actor

Player 2 (Col):Internal Audit / GRC

Strategic Payoff Bimatrix (Player 1, Player 2)

	Sample Audits (Periodic)	100% Continuous Monitoring (CCM)
Strict Compliance	0,10	0,-5
Exploit Control Gap	35,-50	-100,35

Equilibrium Diagnosis

No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium exists.

Neither player can choose a single predictable course of action without being exploited by the counterparty. A mixed strategy (randomized inspection/behavior) is mathematically required.

Required Mixed Enforcement Probabilities

Operations / Rogue Actor:Exploit Control Gap: 15.0%

Internal Audit / GRC:100% Continuous Monitoring (CCM): 25.9%

Executive Behavioral Takeaway

No stable pure equilibrium exists. The system enters an enforcement cycle: If audit tests intermittently, operators exploit (15.0% rate); to deter exploitation, audit must maintain at least a 25.9% coverage intensity.